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ABSTRACT 
Voting via the Internet is part of electronic government and electronic democracy. However, there are many obstacles 
which have to be overcome, especially legal restrictions have to be transformed into technical and security solutions. In 
the first part the article discusses advantages and disadvantages of Internet elections, shows different application fields, 
and presents important international pilot schemes (political and business ones). In the second part, due to democratic 
basic principles, technological security aspects are worked out. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article focusses on technological security needs of Internet elections as part of E-Democracy. These 
needs exist just due to constitutional law principles. However, not only political online elections are regarded, 
but also ballots in universities, for staff councils, in shareholder meetings, etc. The objectives are twofold: (1) 
giving a descriptive overview of the landscape of worldwide online elections and (2) working out technology 
oriented security aspects due to democratic basic principles in order to execute legally accepted online polls. 
First, substantial arguments of proponents and opponents of the Internet elections are presented, so that the 
reader may recover his own poise already here. Subsequently, application fields and precise pilot projects are 
presented. Finally, due to democratic basic principles technological security aspects are worked out. 
2. PROS AND CONS 
Substantial general arguments for the implementation of online elections are the following ones: 
 
Increasing turnout: To what extend a significantly higher election turnout can be achieved, has not been 
sufficiently empirically examined so far. Even if voter turnout information about several pilot projects was 
published, it is difficult to interpret these very numbers, since (1) it is unknown how many voters would have 
otherwise casted their vote traditionally, and (2) these numbers have to be adjusted to temporary effects due 
to advertisement and press coverage. The online election´s influence on the turnout will probably not only 
depend on the kind of poll, but for example also on the respective cultural, political and geographical 
conditions: Australia´s low population density, Greece´s demand to select in one´s birth municipality, and the 
political establishment of referendums in Switzerland are crucial characteristics. 
Cost reduction: Cost savings can occur, if less personnel for performing absentee voting and for 
counting is necessary or if travel activities are reduced. On the other hand building up and operating the poll 
infrastructure as well as equipping the voters with essential hardware cause cost. Furthermore, in the 
foreseeable future of political elections no polling stations will become obsolete. The discussion whether and 
at which elections cost savings will occur is presently speculative. 
Decrease of invalid votes: Invalid votes can be produced consciously or unconsciously. Consciously 
producing invalid votes  are presumably protest against politics in general, therefore they must be provided in 
online elections. Unconsciously produced invalid votes could be already identified at “feeding time“ with 
plausibility checks, so that the voting software could point out this mistake. This means a difference to 
traditional polling booths. Whether this kind of restricting the democratic “principle of equality” is  tolerable 
has to be examined legally. 
Lower election fraud in endangered countries: The security of traditional elections bases on the 
confidence in persons and in the independence of election committees. In endangered countries with young 
democracies the confidence in these mechanisms is lower, and a shift from organizational security 
precautions to technical ones (e.g. cryptographic coding) might be helpful. However, it it necessary to 
mention that the coexistent use of organizational and technical security precautions features a gradual 
character, i.e. the securest technology can always be annulled, if all organizational units involved cooperate 
corruptingly. 
Support of basis democracy: As soon as an Internet-based poll infrastructure is built up basis-
democratic voting processes become more feasible. 
 
On the other hand there is strong concern about online elections: 
Security: Ranking first is security doubt. In traditional elections it is obvious for anyone that a mapping 
of voters on the votes is impossible, because the voting process itself takes place behind physical barriers and 
each voter drops his “locked“ envelope into the voting box. The voter himself monitors the adherence of the 
principle of secrecy. However, regarding absentee voting which is socially, political and legally accepted this 
looks different: There is no guarantee to the voter that his vote won´t be changed, he just trusts in the 
integrity of the involved persons and organizations as well as in the sanctity of the mail. These and many 
further aspects of election security like the warranty of the ballot paper´s “arrival” don´t come up to 
discussion. 
The Internet Voting Task Force (2000) is concerned about the security of computer clients, as the 
presence of worms, viruses and Trojan horses can not be sufficiently surely excluded. 
Low Transparency: Obviously, implementing security requirements with information technology is not 
trivial, even if cryptography offers a rich bundle of methods and instruments. Anyway, using complex 
security procedures leads to increased intransparency to the voter, so that problems regarding elector´s 
acceptance are likely. 
Cost: It is yet unknown, to what extend and when cost for establishing and operating an Internet-based 
poll infrastructure redeems. Disputants of Internet elections deny its´ potential to medium-term cost savings.  
3. APPLICATION FIELDS AND PILOT SCHEMES 
Seminal application fields for online elections are especially large-scale ballots with a tremendous 
organizational work. Polls in small communities like schools or for municipal councils are regarded to a 
lesser extend, rather political elections like diet elections, elections to the German Bundestag, referendums, 
or EU elections, polls within a corporation (workers’ council, board of directors), votes at stockholders´ 
meetings or other annual meetings, or committee elections at universities and schools. Remarkably there is a 
broad consensus that political online voting is not meant to be substitutional rather complementary to 
traditional voting procedures. There is no such consensus about non-political polls. There are several ways to 
execute Internet votes. The California Internet Voting Task Force (2000) differentiates the place from where 
the vote is casted via Internet, referring to a plan by stages: Vote via Internet at (1) a dedicated polling 
station, (2) any polling station, (3) a certified voting terminal (e.g. at a public place), or (4) from any access 
point. This article focusses requirements and experiences with stage no. 4. Due to their exceptional position 
and legal meaning political elections will be considered first. The pilot projects presented below do not claim 
completeness. However, the author thinks he pointed out the essential projects. 
3.1 Political Elections 
Security concerns are surely high when voting online within political range. Not only poll-specific laws 
must be observed but also constitutional principles. Up to now no such election has taken place in Germany. 
According to a statement of the current Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily polling stations (approx. 
80,000 in Germany) shall be equipped with voting computers for the forthcoming election to the German 
Bundestag in 2006. The first Internet election is planned to take place in 2010 (Philippsen, 2002). In 2000 
approx. 250 soldiers could use a “certified virus-free” computer to participate in the US-presidential election. 
Unfortunately, there is only few information about the Internet voting procedure (Philippsen, 2002). In 2000 
about 40,000 entitled voters used the opportunity to cast their vote online during Democratic Party´s 
Presidential Primary election (Election.com, 2000; Mohen & Glidden, 2000; Philips & von Spankovsky, 
2001). Several security problems occurred, e.g. denial-of-service attacks as well as the uncertainty of the 
voter, if his vote was really counted. In 2003 for the first time in Switzerland the Geneva suburb Anières 
accomplished an official Internet election within the scope of a municipal project; about 28% of the eligibles 
voters elected online (Geneva, 2003). To what extent this percentage just based on the innovative character 
and publicity is not known. Furthermore there is no information about emerged security problems. 
3.2 Non-Political Elections 
Elections at universities and schools are also classified as non-political ones although they might have a 
political facet. There have been already numerous pilot schemes in different countries and contexts. The 
“Forschungsgruppe Internetwahlen” supported by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
contributed some pioneer work in Germany and created a special voting software called i-vote. Several 
ballots have been accomplished with this software, for example in February 2000 the representatives for the 
student parliament at the University of Osnabrück could be voted electronically (Otten, 2001), and 
approximately 400 students voted via Internet. In May 2002 the workers’ representation at the LDS 
Brandenburg (state office for data processing and statistics) was elected by the workers only at dedicated 
voting terminals with special signature cards. These cards were intended to be used afterwards as part of the 
e-government programme in Brandenburg. Philippsen (2002) took a closer look at the student parliament 
election and identified some security problems. Furthermore he found fault that the exact procedure is still 
confidential and yet no source code has been published. With support of the German Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Work in 2002 the project W.I.E.N. (Elections in electronic nets) was initiated aiming at 
developing and testing online voting procedures in economy. Coexistently, the German Federal Ministry of 
the Interior tries for getting experience with political online elections. Internationally-active is the company 
election.com which accomplished numerous polls via Internet. Beside the Democratic Party´s Presidential 
Primary election the company was also assigned to execute an election for the English Sheffield City 
Council, for the Australian Information Industry Association (AIIA), and to the student parliament at the 
University of Technology in Auckland. 
4. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
Legal, political science based, and social requirements on elections are deep-seated in appropriate laws 
and have been primarily addressed with organizational measures so far. For example, physical barriers 
contribute to ballots´ secrecy and the legally prescribed temporal restriction of vote casting is implemented 
with opening times of the polling stations. Absentee voting already requires a special treatment and had to be 
legally anchored. In order to guarantee a ballot´s secrecy the sanctity of the mail was consulted, but the legal 
anchorage of Internet elections will probably become even harder. Information technology opens a new 
dimension, which has to accommodate legal general conditions. In other words, these basic conditions and 
laws must be technologically implemented in Internet elections. Technological efforts may not be an end in 
itself, but they make for implementation of those basic conditions. One can also call it a mapping of basic 
conditions on technological components. Beyond that further requirements occur, in particular economic and 
ergonomic ones, i.e. Internet elections should be as inexpensive and user-friendly as possible (see figure 1); 
already in 1996 Cranor formulated general requirements for electronic elections. 
 Figure 1 doesn´t show all dependencies, but the arrows indicate the most important ones. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: System of requirements 
 
 
 The necessity to systematically analyze security requirements is substantiated by the security problems 
arisen in practical pilot schemes. The accurate security conditions depend on the concrete election. 
Nevertheless, at least the election-oriented democratic principles as fixed in the German “Grundgesetz” 
(constitutional law) can be consulted as starting point for the formulation of security-technological 
requirements. Supplementing, at each case further legal basic conditions are to be considered. It should be 
stressed that concrete security arrangements of an election aim at accomplishing a ballot-specific security 
level and that technology alone cannot solve the security problem: security is the result of organizational, 
legal, and technological measures. In the German “Grundgesetz” they say (translated): ”In the counties and 
townships the people must have representatives which have been elected in general, direct, free, equal, and 
secret elections.” They also say:” The representatives of the ´Bundestag´ are voted in direct, free, equal, and 
secret elections.” Including the juridical-oriented discussion of Ruess (2000) one can bridge from law to 
technology: 
 
General election: The basic principle “generality” assures the option to vote to all eligible voters. Since 
voting via Internet represents an additional way to voting, there seems to arise no problem. However, it has to 
be discussed whether the breakdown of technical system components limits the general right to vote, if five 
minutes before the end of voters´ time slot no connection to the polling server can be established due to its 
capacity overload. Thinking in terms of a client-server-architecture the following requirements result: On the 
client side the voting software and hardware (card reader, e.g.) must work properly.  The voter is partially in 
charge for this, as he has to ensure that on its computer no disturbing software runs, which makes the 
network device fail, e.g. The same applies to the server side. One of the largest problems is the disturbance of 
a network connection basing on a (partial) Internet breakdown. For example, denial of service attacks can 
paralyze routers and polling servers. Yet, due to the coexistence of traditional voting channels the question 
whether such a reliability has to be guaranteed at all arises. 
Direct election: The ballot´s directness means that between casting of votes and their counting only the 
mathematical determination may occur, thus no electors may be instituted. This is a matter of no importance 
in the context of Internet elections, even though the implementation of election processes has to fulfill this 
requirement. 
Free election: According to this principle the poll procedure must not be affected by public force or 
private pressure. In this regard, to the Internet elections the same items and doubts apply as in case of 
absentee voting, because preventing an influencing control technologically is impossible. Lodging the claim 
that the voter receives a proof that his vote was counted unchanged one can think of a receipt mechanism, 
which however must not show the vote´s content. Lacking provableness is against extortion and paid votes. 
Equal election: The principle of equality subsumes two aspects: (1) All voting cards are to be granted 
same status, so that those in the Internet must have the same appearance and the same structure as all other 
voting cards. Demanding the use of dedicated hardware (chip-card reader with integrated display and input 
device), consequently the same requirements are to be made against this hardware. Particularly, the voting 
card as a whole has to be displayed and may not be implicitly weighted by the “scrolling feature”. (2) 
Regarding the individual voter it must apply strictly that each vote has same weight. This means first that any 
eligible voter may only vote once (authentication is necessary). In order to implement authentication (and 
authorization) digital signatures can be applied. Secondly, it means that any vote has to be supplied unaltered 
(integrity). It must be assured that no malfunctioning or cankered software (viruses, worms, Trojan horses 
etc.) changes the vote notelessly. This can probably only be ensured if secure auxiliary hardware featuring a 
peculiar display and input device (e.g. keyboard) is applied. Moreover, the vote must not be corrupted during 
its transfer. For this purpose, proven cryptographic methods can be consulted. Furthermore, the vote must not 
be changed on any election server. Thirdly, the electronic vote may not be copied by anyone. 
Secret election: The keeping of vote secrecy together with the consideration of equality and the aligned 
integrity belong to the most difficult tasks. In this regard, accepting absentee voting a compromise was 
already made. Compromising attacks can occur at the same spots already discussed above. The transmission 
of all data to voting servers must be encoded. On vote servers´ side is has to be ensured that no mapping from 
voter on his vote decision is possible. Beyond public key infrastructures this also requires organizational 
measures. For instance, there is a strict necessity to have at least two entities: a voting host controlling 
authorization and authentication, not being able to read the vote, making it anonymous, and forwarding votes 
to a voting box (or many) which just counts the (anonymous) votes. 
5. CONCLUSION  
During the past years many pilot projects were conducted, which examined Internet elections in different 
contexts with large commitment. Unfortunately, assigned procedures are often not disclosed probably for 
entrepreneurial reason. There is also a need for basic research, e.g. it is still open how casted votes should be 
receipted and which voting protocols should be used in which case. Furthermore there is a lack of appropriate 
methods for developing security standards and checking the implementation of security requirements. 
Despite encouraging theoretical and empirical results research is still in its infancy and many problems 
will probably be detected first in the course of further pilot projects. 
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